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STANDARDS-A SAFEGUARD FOR POWER
STANDARDS-A SAFEGUARD FOR THE EXERCISE
OF DELEGATED POWER
Maurice H. Merrill*
There is a widely approved "doctrine that delegation of legis-
lative or judicial power to administrative agencies must be limited
by the imposition of legislatively prescribed standards,"' in order
to be valid under state and national constitutions.2 In the words of
one of the most articulate of our modern judges, the administrator
is not to be turned loose with "a roving commission to inquire into
evils and upon discovery correct them."3
The doctrine has a twofold ancestry. On the one hand, it comes
down in lineal descent from the ancient dogma, deduced from the
universal distribution of powers, legislative, executive and judicial
amongst three departments of government, that "legislative" power,
constitutionally vested in the "legislative" branch, may not be trans-
ferred to unauthorized hands. 4 Through the process of attempting
to reconcile this by-product of our basic agency theory of govern-
ment with the practical need for subdivision of authority, there
evolved the "Ranney rule" that "power to make the law," necessarily
involving "a discretion as to what it shall be," cannot be delegated,
while to the "conferring authority or discretion as to the law's exe-
cution.., under and in pursuance thereof, no valid objection can
be made."5 As delegations multiplied and as their subjects became
more complex, sophisticated judges realized how much that was
done under them did, in fact, involve discretion respecting what
should be the rules under which men must live. In time, this recog-
nition bore fruit in statements that legislative power in fact may
be delegated, so long as the original repository does not "abdicate
or transfer to others its [essential] legislative function."6 A typical
statement, modern and short, runs: "The Legislature may delegate
* LL.B. 1922, Oklahoma; S.J.D. 1925 Harvard; Research Professor of Law,
University of Oklahoma.
1 See 1 F. CooPER, STATE ADMINISTRATiVE LAW 54 (1965).
2 See generally, L. JAFrEr, JuDiciARY CONTROL Op ADMINIsTRATIVE ACTION
Ch. 2 (1965) for the history of the doctrine.
3 A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551
(1935) (concurring opinion).
4 See Cheadle, The Delegation of Legislative Functions, 27 YALE L.J.
892 (1918); Duff & Whiteside, Delegata Potestas non Potest Delegari:
A Maxim of American Constitutional Law, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 168 (1929).
5 See Cincinnati W. & Z. Ry. Co. v. Comm'rs of Clinton County, 1 Ohio
St. 66, 76 (1852).6 See Keeting v. Pub. Util. Dist., 49 Wash. 2d 761, 767, 306 P.2d 762, 766
(1957).
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this [legislative] authority provided it states the purpose for doing
so and sets up reasonable standards to guide the agency which is
to administer it. ' '"
Upon this foundation, the doctrine of standards is an emana-
tion from the constitution of the particular governmental entity,
the legislature of which has attempted the delegation. Thus, no
federal constitutional question is presented by a delegation made
by a state legislature.8 With respect to that question, the decision
of the state court interpreting the state constiution is final.9
The second derivation of the requirement of standards is from
the constitutional guaranties against deprivations of life, liberty or
property without due process of law. Through a long and familiar
process of construction, these have become bulwarks against arbi-
trary impingement by government upon these enumerated inter-
ests.10 An analogue of this concept is the "rule of law." If there is
to be an effective rule of law, subordinate officials ought not to be
turned loose to interfere at their own will with the lives, liberties
and property of their fellow men. If these officials are to be given
power, there must be adequate standards by which their will or their
ingenuity, whatever one wishes to call it, may be guided and re-
strained." As Mr. Justice Frankfurter reminded us:
7 See Schutte v. Schmitt, 162 Neb. 162, 166, 75 N.W.2d 656, 659 (1956).
8 Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608 (1937).
9 Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176 (1935).
10 See B. WEIGHT, AMERIcAx INTERPRETATIONS OF NATURAL LAW 298-306
(1931).
11 See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). "When we consider the
nature and the theory of our institutions of government, the principles
upon which they are suppposed to rest, and review the history of their
development, we are constrained to conclude that they do not mean
to leave room for the play and action of purely personal and arbitrary
power. Sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for it is the
author and source of law; but in our system, while sovereign powers
are delegated to the agencies of government, sovereignty itself remains
with the people, by whom and for whom all government exists and
acts. And the law is the definition and limitation of power. It is, in-
deed, quite true, that there must always be lodged somewhere, and
in some person or body, the authority of final decision; and in many
cases of mere administration the responsibility is purely political, no
appeal lying except to the ultimate tribunal of the public judgment,
exercised either in the pressure of opinion or by means of the suffrage.
But the fundamental rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happi-
ness, considered as individual popssessions, are secured by those max-
ims of constitutional law which are the monuments showing the vic-
torious progress of the race in securing to men the blessings of civili-
zation under the reign of just and equal laws, so that, in the famous
language of the Massachusetts Bill of Rights, the government of the
commonwealth 'may be a government of laws and not of men.' For,
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Prohibition through words that fail to convey what is permitted
and what is prohibited for want of appropriate objective standards,
offends Due Process in two ways. First, it does not sufficiently
apprise those bent on obedience of law of what may reasonably be
foreseen to be found illicit by the law-enforcing authority, whether
court or jury or administrative agency. Secondly, where licensing
is rested, in the first instance, in an administrative agency, the
available judicial review is in effect rendered inoperative. On the
basis of such a portmanteau word as 'sacreligious', the judiciary has
no standards with which to judge the validity of administrative
action which necessarily involves, at least in large measure, sub-
jective determinations. Thus, the administrative first step becomes
the last step. 2
If we accept this proposition that due process of law commands
that delegation to administrators be made only under adequate guid-
ance, it follows that there is a potential federal question respecting
the propriety of every such state investiture. True, there may be
found an occasional careless statement which could be interpreted
otherwise.1 3 However, on examination, such a statement relates to
the contention that the state constitution has been condemned.
From 1886 on, the Supreme Court of the United States has enter-
tained cases wherein the fourteenth amendment served as the ve-
hicle for attack on the sufficience of prescribed standards.1 4 It has
struck down legislation which it has found wanting in this respect.15
We are not justified in assuming that a tool so frequently used has
become obsolete.
Another argument for the obsolescence of the doctrine of
standards, with respect to federal delegations, stresses the point
that on only two occasions,' now more than thirty years past, have
the very idea that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the
means of living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment of
life, at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any country
where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself." Id.
at 369-70.
12 See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 532 (1952) (concur-
ring opinion).
13 See Highland Farms Dairy v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608 (1937).
14 Douglas v. Noble, 261 U.S. 165 (1923); New York ex rel. Lieberman
v. Van De Carr, 199 U.S. 552 (1905).
15 Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958), citing a long list of other
decisions at pages 322-24 in which ordinances requiring administra-
tive permits for other exercises of civil rights were held invalid be-
cause the permit could be issued or withheld according to an unlimited
administrative discretion, not geared to any legitimate public interest.
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952); Saia v. New York,
334 U.S. 558 (1948); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
16 A. L. A. Schechter Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama
Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
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such congressional grants been held to be too liberal.1 7 Indeed, one
dissenting judge bitterly exclaimed that the majority had overruled
the most significant decision.' 8 However, like many impatient state-
ments of outvoted jurists, the assertion does not comport with ap-
parent facts. In no instance has the court itself declared the aban-
donment of the Panama-Schechter principle. It has treated these
two cases wherever it has had occasion to cite them as respected
authorities. It has been careful to distinguish them upon appro-
priate occasion.' 9 In recent time, we have seen a statutory delega-
tion read restrictively in order to avoid a possible collision with
the doctrine of standards, with approving citation of the Panama
decision.20 Still more recently, the Court has sustained a federal
delegation on the ground of the adequacy of the standards, while
recognizing the substantiality of an attack upon the validity of the
delegation through an invocation of the fifth amendment's due proc-
ess clause.21 It seems evident that Mark Twain's comment that
the reports of his demise were grossly exaggerated aptly may be
applied to proclamations of impending funeral services for the doc-
trine of standards at either the state or federal levels or with respect
to either the delegation or the due process theories.
This is the current state of decision. Still, it appropriately may
be asked, what is the practical value of the doctrine of standards?
Since it rests not upon specific constitutional texts, but upon judicial
construction of very broad constitutional provisions, I suppose it
may be proper to argue that this interpretation should be re-exam-
ined in the light of experience, to determine whether it is proper
to continue the accepted reading. It is not a situation wherein it is
proper to argue that a meaning envisioned clearly by the framers
of constitutional language should not be departed from except by
the legitimizing process of amendment. When the prototypes of
our constitution were framed, the full potentialities of the adminis-
17 Such, to a greater or less degree, seems to be the burden of B.
SCHWARTZ, INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 41 (1958);
1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 2.06 (1958); L. JAFFE,
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 69 (1965). See also
Nutting, Congressional Delegations Since the Schechter Case, 14 MISS.
L.J. 350, 367 (1942).
'8 Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 452 (1944) (dissenting opinion),
says that it "leaves no doubt that the [Schechter] decision is now
overruled."
19 See Brannan v. Stark, 342 U.S. 451 (1952); Lichter v. United States,
334 U.S. 742, 784 (1948); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 249 (1947);
N.B.C. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943); United States v.
Rock Royal Co-op., 307 U.S. 533, 574 (1939); Currin v. Wallace, 306
U.S. 1, 15 (1939).
20 Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958).
21 Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
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trative process were not fully appreciated. There was a definite
concept of what we now call the "rule of law" and of the applica-
tion of the separation of powers to insure its enforcement. As it was
put by Bay, J., in one of the first full scale discussions, after inde-
pendence, of the problems of administrative law, the doctrine was
that "it was the province of the legislative branch of the govern-
ment to make laws and create offices; but it was the province of
the judiciary to construe them, when made, and keep the officers
within the bounds of duty, when once appointed.122 However, the
evolution of the concept of standards as an application of the consti-
tutionally established "rule of law" was yet to be worked out. If it
represents a useless and impeditive implication, the same judicial
process that created it rightly may reject it. Let us then turn to a
brief examination of its uses.
I suggest that the practical employment of the doctrine of stand-
ards embodies a number of useful functions. It furnishes guidance
for administrators in the application of the statutes entrusted to
their care. It affords safeguards against unwarranted enlargement
of legislative grants. It focuses attention upon the public objectives
of statutes. It limits the extension of discretion as to social policy
beyond the approved legislative direction. Judicial enforcement of
the requirement for standards improves legislative draftsmanship.
The insistence upon the observation of standards impels explora-
tion by the agencies as to the existence or absence of conditions
justifying proposed action. Appropriate standards, of course, are an
almost indispensable prerequisite to effective judicial review of
administrative action. Let us review briefly examples of each of
these functions.
The view has been expressed that standards do not contribute
to the guidance of administrators. 23 However, the leading example
cited in support of this verdict of futility seems to me to point the
other way. The example is the well-publicized New Jersey act
of a few years ago, forbidding strikes against public utilitiy proper-
ties after seizure by the Governor, and requiring submission of "any
and all disputes then existing between the public utilities and the
employees" to a Board of Arbitration, selected ad hoc, with instruc-
tions merely to "arbitrate the matters submitted to it" and, having
heard the matters, "to make written findings of fact and to pro-
mulgate a written decision and order upon the issue or issues."2 4
The Supreme Court of New Jersey invalidated this provision as a
22 Geter v. Comm'rs for Tobacco Inspection, I Bay 354 (S.C. 1794).
23 See 1 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 2.10 (1958).
24 The summary is taken from the statutes as quoted in State v. Traffic
Telephone Workers' Fed'n, 2 N.J. 335, 340, 66 A.2d 616, 618 (1949).
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delegation without standards.25 The act was upheld26 when the leg-
islature amended it to provide that the board's decision should be
based up these enumerated factors:
(1) The interests and welfare of the public.
(2) Comparison of the wages, hours and conditions of employment
of the employees involved in the arbitration proceedings, and the
wages, hours and conditions of employment of employees doing
the same, similar or comparable work or work requiring the same,
similar or comparable skills and expenditure of energy and effort,
giving consideration to such factors as are peculiar to the industry
involved.
(3) Comparison of wages, hours and conditions of employment as
reflected in industries in general and in public utilities in particular
throughout the nation and in the State of New Jersey.
(4) The security and tenure of employment with due regard for
the effect of technological changes thereon as well as the effect of
any unique skills and attributes developed in the industry.
(5) Such other factors not confined to the foregoing which are nor-
mally or traditionally taken into consideration in the determina-
tion of wages, hours and conditions of employment through volun-
tary collective bargaining, arbitration or otherwise between the
parties or in the industry.27
So, far from being useless generalities, these enumerations focus the
attention of the arbitrators upon the items which they are to weigh
in the balance. Conversely, as was pointed out in the earlier deci-
sion, use of the language of arbitration, without more specific guid-
ance, carried "the implication that the board will act.., not accord-
ing to established criteria but according to the ideas of justice or
of expedience of the individual arbitrators.
' '28
It will not do to shrug off the significant difference in the legis-
lative wording on the cynical assumption that the arbitrators would
disregard the enacted source of their authority. The whole law of
reversible error in respect to the instruction of jurors is based upon
the common experience that jurors do take instructions seriously
and do try to apply them. We have no warrant for assuming that
administrators will be less regardful of their instructions.
A case in point is afforded by recent litigation in Washington.29
A statute provided for the accreditation and approval of medical
25 Id. at 335, 66 A.2d at 616.
26 New Jersey Bell Tel. Co. v. Communication Workers No. 55, 5 N.J.
354, 75 A.2d 721 (1950).
27 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13B-27 (1949).
28 See State v. Traffic Telephone Workers Fed'n, 2 N.J. 335, 354, 66 A.2d
616, 626 (1949).
29 Reagles v. Simpson, - Wash. 2d - , 434 P.2d 559 (1967).
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schools by the state board of medical examiners in accordance with
the standards listed in the footnote.30 In connection with a move-
ment, unquestionably praiseworthy, for more closely knitting the
medical physicians and the osteopathic physicians, it occurred to
some of the proponents to organize a "medical school" that would
give short term "refresher" instruction to licensed osteopaths, on
the successful conclusion of which they would be awarded an M.D.
degree. The "school" and its course apparently were "one-shot"
projects, designed simply to bring osteopaths, already educated, into
the medical fold. The school's application for accreditation as a
medical school, as originally presented, was refused by the board
on the ground that the school did not meet the statutory standards
in several respects.sl
Following a change in the personnel of the board, there was a
rehearing which brought forth a bare majority favoring accredita-
tion. The outcome we shall note hereafter. For our present pur-
poses, the important matter is that the board in its original decision
did read the standards set forth in the statute, and did undertake to
give them effect as it understood them. Standards do serve as guides
to administrators. As Professor Jaffe has observed, the doctrine of
standards "has indeed positive virtue, since it assists administrator
and court in minimizing arbitrary and discriminatory determina-
30 WAsH. REv. CODE § 18.71.055 (1961). "The board may accredit and ap-
prove any medical school provided that it: (1) Requires collegiate in-
struction which training shall include theoretical and laboratory
courses in physics, biology, inorganic and organic chemistry; (2) Pro-
vides adequate instruction in the following subjects: Anatomy, bio-
chemistry, microbiology and immunology, pathology, pharmacology,
physiology, anaesthesiology, dermatology, gynecology, internal medi-
cine, neurology, obstetrics, ophthalmology, orthopedic surgery, oto-
laryngology, pediatrics, physical medicine and rehabilitation, preven-
tive medicine and public health, psychiatry, radiology, surgery and
urology; (3) Provides clinical instruction in hospital wards and out-
patient clinics under guidance. Approval may be withdrawn by the
board at any time a medical school ceases to comply with one or more
of the requirements of this section."
31 "The Board, on March 20, 1964, refused accreditation, basing that de-
cision on the following conclusions: (1) In view of the complexities
and technical nature of the subjects mentioned by RCW 18.71.055, it
would not be possible to adequately instruct students in these subjects
in the above mentioned twelve sessions consisting of approximately
sixty actual hours. (2) It would not be possible to provide adequate
clinical instruction in hospital wards and out patient clinics under
guidance in the time permitted by the above mentioned curriculum.
(3) The Board does not interpret the legislative intent as found in
RCW 18.71.050 and .055 as permitting it to accredit as a medical school
a school which provides only sixty actual hours of instruction on twelve
consecutive Saturdays." Reagles v. Simpson, - Wash. 2d - -
434 P.2d 559, 562 (1967).
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tions. '132 While his encomium seems directed at the doctrine's use-
fulness in licensing activity only, there is no good reason to deny
similar utility in other fields.83
Another, perhaps related, result of the doctrine of standards
is that it safeguards against the improper enlargement of legisla-
tively granted authority. An attempt to substitute administrative
convenience for individual consideration, by a broad rule generally
limiting the amounts to be paid to parents for the support of Indian
minors out of the minors' income, except upon express showing by
the parents that larger distributions would be spent properly for
the minors' interests, was thwarted in the Work case.34 The statute
had commanded payment to the parents, subject to the privilege
to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to withhold payments if he
were satisfied that "the said interest of any minor is being misused
or squandered." 35 The court properly characterized the administra-
tive action in the following language:
The record shows that the Secretary enlarged this discretion
vested in him and his subordinate into a power to lay down regula-
tions, limiting in advance the amount to be paid to the parents to
a certain monthly rate, and declaring that no use of the funds would
be permitted which did not inure to the separate benefit of the
minor. He was led to take this action, which was a departure from
the previous practice of the Department during the decade imme-
diately following the pasage of the act, because of the sudden
increase in the income of the minors resulting from the bonuses
given for mineral leases. However desirable such regulations were,
in view of the changed circumstances, we think they were in the
nature of legislation beyond the power of the Secretary. 36
Another striking example of this effect of the doctrine of stan-
dards is afforded by judicial repulse of an attempt by an adminis-
trator to extend the standard of immorality to ban the portrayal of
movies tending to support unorthodox economic and social ideas.37
In another instance, an attempt to impose re-examination of a li-
32 L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADmINISTRATIVE AcT oN 85 (1965).
33 Compare the careful attention given to the standard of "public interest"
in respect to unfair methods of competition by the Civil Aeronautics
Board as reflected in American Airlines ,Inc. v. North American Air-
lines, Inc., 351 U.S. 79 (1956).
34 Work v. United States ex rel. Mosier, 261 U.S. 352 (1923).
35 Act of June 28, 1906, ch. 3572, § 4, 34 Stat. 539.
36 See Work v. United States ex rel. Mosier, 261 U.S. 352, 359-60 (1923).
37 Schuman v. Pickert, 277 Mich. 225, 269 N.W. 152 (1936). The example
is not rendered less pertinent by the fact that the whole system of
advance censorship imposed by the legislation under consideration
might fall under today's interpretation of safeguards in favor of liberty
of speech. That doctrine was not available at the time.
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censed driver upon grounds not authorized by the statutory stan-
dard was judicially repelled.2 8
Blending into the preceding function is the effect of standards
in focusing attention upon the public objectives sought to be
achieved by statutory regulation. 9 The court or the administrator
thus may see whether the action taken or proposed has "a rational
connection" with a proper public interest comprehended within
the statute.40 This focus may be liberating41 as well as confining4 2
in its effect upon administrative action.
Judicial recognition 3 and scholarly observation" alike attest
to the usefulness of an adherence to the requirement of standards
as a means to improved legislative drafting. If we make the legisla-
tures advertent to the need for expressing standards with a certain
clarity, they will at least attempt to conform to what they think the
courts will exact of them. With some reason, we may hope that
this process will lead them to develop more adequate listings of their
goals and to improve their product by advertence to the numerous
public "goods" amongst which government must choose in pro-
moting the general welfare.4 5
38 Carnegie v. Dep't of Public Safety, 60 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 1952).
39 See Schware v. Bd. of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957).
40 Recent examples are afforded by Guenther v. Morehead, 272 F. Supp.
721 (S.D. Iowa 1967) (single wrongful negotiation of check not com-
prehended within statutory standard of "practice"); DeHart v. Cotts,
99 Ariz. 350, 409 P.2d 50 (1965) (rule-making authority "for the per-
formance of its duties" does not give the examining and licensing
board authority to prescribe substantive regulations for practice by
chiropractors); Oregon Newspaper Publishers Ass'n. v. Peterson, 244
Ore. 116, 415 P.2d 21 (1966) (authority to regulate practice of pharm-
acy and sale of poisons and dangerous drugs does not extend to pro-
hibiting advertising of "prescription drugs.").
41 See Transcontinental Bus. Sys., Inc. v. CAB, 383 F.2d 466, 476-85 (5th
Cir. 1967), with respect to the discussion of the standard of discrimi-
natory rates and its variety of application in effect upon the traveling
public.
42 Hynes v. Grimes Packing Co., 337 U.S. 86 (1949) (express statutory
prohibition of exclusive rights of fishery); Broadway, Laguna, Vallejo
Ass'n v. Board of Permit Appeals, -Cal. 2. 427 P.2d 810, 59
Cal. Rptr. 146 (1967) (undue extension of terms "exceptional circum-
stances," "unnecessary hardship," and "practical difficulty"); Trans-
continental Bus System, Inc. v. CAB, 383 F.2d 466, 484 (5th Cir. 1967),
as to the failure of the standard in question to give the agency "license
to resort to the full spectrum of broad social policy considerations
which might rationally bear on the issue of whether the circumstances
and conditions of service are substantially similar."
43 See Brannan v. Stark, 342 U.S. 451, 465 n.16 (1952).
44 See Nutting, Congressional Delegations Since the Schechter Case, 14
Mss. L.J. 350, 353 (1942).
45 See Reich, The Law of the Planned Society, 75 YALE L.J. 1226, 1262
(1966).
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From another standpoint, the requirement of standards may be
regarded as a safeguard against administrative free-wheeling,46
through imposing upon the agencies the duty to explore the situa-
tion confronting them to determine the existence or the absence
of conditions justifying their proposed action.47 The showing must
be sufficiently in detail to enable the court to see that the agency
has related its decisions to the statutory standard.48
We who believe in the "rule of law" probably find the most
satisfying proof of the usefulness of standards in the aid, the almost
indispensable aid, which they afford the courts in the review of
agency action. Legislative mandates which lack them in a suffi-
ciently meaningful form should be invalid by virtue of that defi-
ciency.49 If the standards are minimally valid, the judicial insistence
upon demonstrated agency advertence to all significant factors
which might bear upon their proper implementation is a stimulus
to better decision. 50 It has even been asserted that, under broad
standards, a radical change in policy cannot "be justified without
46 See WARE, PANrKKAR AND ROmEIN, HISTORY OF MAN=D-THE TWEN-
TIETH CENTURY 805 (1966).
47 Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941) (insistence that
agency make specific indication that it has considered the statutory
standard); New England Elec. Sys. v. SEC, 376 F.2d 107 (1st Cir. 1967)
(need for particularization in applying standard). In Securities and
Exchange Com. v. New England Elec. System, 88 S.Ct. 916 (1968),
the Supreme Court reversed the First Circuit ruling, holding that the
reviewing court had been unduly picayune in requiring a more com-
prehensive analysis of factors than had been engaged in by the agency.
Personally, I concur with the First Circuit, and mourn the Supreme
Court's position as an unwise limit on the effective policing of stan-
dards. However, a difference in opinion as to the proper exercise of
a function in a particular instance does not detract from the signifi-
cance of the function in general.
48 See Transcontinental Bus Sys. Inc., v. CAB, 383 F.2d 466, 489 (5th
Cir. 1967).
49 United Steelworkers v. Bagwell, 383 F.2d 492 (4th Cir. 1967).
50 "We do not agree that Congress limited ICC consideration under § 20a
to an inquiry into fiscal manipulation. Even if Congress' primary con-
cern was to prevent such manipulation, the broad terms 'public interest'
and 'lawful object' negate the existence of a mandate to the ICC to
close its eyes to facts indicating that the transaction may exceed limit-
ations imposed by other relevant laws. Common sense and sound
administrative policy point to the conclusion that such broad statutory
standards require at least some degree of consideration of control and
anticompetitive consequences when suggested by the circumstances
surrounding a particular transaction. Both the ICC and this Court
have read terms such as 'public interest' broadly, to require consider-
ation of all important consequences including anticompetitive effects."
Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R. Co. v. United States, 387 U.S. 485,
492 (1967).
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any evidentiary basis or rational justification." 51 In other words,
the administrative duty to explore all the facets of the situations
arising under standards of wide-ranging possibilities is enforced
as an adjunct to effective judicial review. Contrariwise, a clearly
worded standard, reasonably explicit in its command, affords a most
potent weapon against agency arbitrariness. 52 Besides, there is the
fortunately rare instance in which the agency, whether for good
motives or bad, undertakes to ignore the legislative policy. In such
instances, a well-drawn standard affords the best recourse against
the attempted usurpation.53
The doctrine of standards, then, should be cherished as one of
our effective methods of building a sound system of administrative
law. It seems to me that one of the reasons for the disrepute into
which it has fallen is the failure of judges and of systematic writers
to pay sufficient attention to the analysis of the grounds upon which
standards may be sustained. The succeeding paragraphs constitute
an attempt to present such an analysis. The cases may be classified,
I believe, into the following categories.
(1) Specific Prescriptions.
In this category may be placed the standards which prescribe
specific and objective tests against which the action taken is to
be tried. A street vendor must be a citizen or have declared his
intent so to become, must pay a specified fee, be resident within
the city and be of good character.54 A taxing statute, based on de-
clared value of capital stock, leaves to the taxpayer the right to
make the declaration for the first year; thereafter the sum is the
original value as changed by specified capital adjustments laid down
in the statute.55 The legislature tells a licensing board that it may
impose disciplinary sanctions upon one who "has been convicted in
a court of competent jurisdiction, either within or without this state,
51 See Transcontinental Bus Sys., Inc. v. CAB, 383 F.2d 466, 491 (5th
Cir. 1967); and cf. NLRB v. Groendyke Transp., Inc., 372 F.2d 137(10th Cir. 1967).
52 Stammer v. Bd. of Regents, 287 N.Y. 359, 39 N.E.2d 913 (1942) (prose-
cution of physician, who aided in a cure by unorthodox methods, on
the alleged ground of treatment of disease by secret method, the statu-
tory standard, although facts disclosed no secrecy, was employed).
53 A recent example is afforded by Reagles v. Simpson, - Wash.2d-,
434 P.2d 559 (1967), in which new personnel on the agency apparently
were oversold by enthusiasts for a particular change in policy. See also
Bd. of Trustees v. State, ex rel. Russell, - Ind. - , 219 N.E.2d 886
(1966).
54 Hughes v. City of Detroit, 217 Mich. 567, 187 N.W. 530 (1922).
55 Helvering v. Lerner Stores Corp., 314 U.S. 463 (1941).
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of a crime .... -56 Of this the Supreme Court of the United States
has said:
As interpreted by the New York courts, the provision is extremely
broad in that it includes convictions for any crime in any court of
competent jurisdiction within or without New York State. This
may be stringent and harsh but it is not vague. The professional
standard is clear. The discretion left to enforcing officers is not one
of defining the offense. It is merely that of matching the measure
of the discipline to the specific case.57
A statute prescribes substantive provisions which must be incor-
porated in all insurance policies issued within the state, leaving to
the insurance commissioners the approval or disapproval of specific
forms on the basis of whether they embrace the required sub-
stance.5s
In all these instances, discretion as to policy is completely non-
existent. There is no room for administrative adventuring in
respect thereto.
(2) Reasonably Detailed Portraiture of Legislative Purpose.
In the standards which it seems to me properly may be placed
in this category, the administrator is given a substantial degree of
freedom to determine what measures will accomplish the legisla-
tive objective. The objective itself, however, is so described that
the words themselves afford little room for debate as to what the
legislators sought to achieve. The administrator therefore should
have no difficulty in framing his action to comply with that purpose.
If for some reason he departs therefrom, judicial corrective action
should present no great difficulty.
There are numerous examples in the reports. One is afforded
by the frequently cited instance in which the Secretary of the Treas-
ury was to prescribe "uniform standards of purity, quality and fit-
ness for consumption of all kinds of teas imported into the United
States...."59 The court had no difficulty in discerning "the purpose
to exclude the lowest grades of tea, whether demonstrably of infer-
ior purity, or unfit for consumption, or presumably so because of
their inferior quality."'6 0 Boiled down, the dominant concept is
that admissible tea shall be fit for human consumption, a not un-
manageable idea, conformance to which certainly is as demonstrable
as conformity to other standards which the legal process is accus-
tomed to enforce.
56 Barsky v. Bd. of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 446 (1954).
57 Id. at 448.
58 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hardison, 199 Mass. 190, 85 N.E. 410 (1908).
59 Act of March 2, 1897, ch. 358, § 3, 29 Stat. 604, 605.
60 Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 496 (1904).
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Other examples include the determination of whether a bridge
constitutes an unreasonable obstruction to navigation;61 whether
kerosene oil is safe, pure, luminous and free from objectionable
substances,62 again a standard expressing an ultimate concern for
the welfare of the consumer in respect to the very qualities which
bear on the satisfactory use of the product; the fixation of a national
marketing quota for tobacco adequate to maintain a specifically
prescribed reserve supply, together with apportionment of that
quota among tobacco raising states and among individual producers
in the states, in accordance with their past productive history
adjusted to allow for explicitly enumerated factors;6 the prescrip-
tion of rules for the control, direction, parking and general regula-
tion of traffic and automobiles upon the campuses and streets of
state institutions; 64 whether prospective trainers of guide dogs for
the blind know the special problems of the blind, how to teach the
blind, and are suited temperamentally and otherwise to train blind
persons in the use of guide dogs;65 whether certain forms of den-
tists' advertising is misleading;6 prescription of regulations govern-
ing public beach use to provide for compliance with the terms, con-
ditions and covenants by which the easements therefor were
acquired.67
In connection with this category, it should be noted that words
which have achieved a generally well-defined meaning in the field
wherein they are used do not become unconstitutionally ambiguous
simply because it is shown that some authorities in the field give
definitions somewhat variable in content.6 8
In some instances, very imprecise standards, such as "public
interest," are regarded as sufficiently objectified by reference to a
sufficiently detailed specification of particular factors which are
61 Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364 (1907).
62 Red "C" Oil Mfg. Co. v. Bd. of Agriculture, 222 U.S. 380 (1912).
63 Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38 (1939).
64 Cohen v. Mississippi State Univ., 256 F. Supp. 954 (N.D. Miss. 1966).
65 Eye Dog Foundation v. State Bd. of Guide Dogs for the Blind, - Cal
2d - , 432 P.2d 717, 63 Cal. Rptr. 21 (1967) ("discretion is not un-
controlled and unguided if it calls for the exercise of judgment of a
high order.").
66 Angelos v. State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 244 Ore. 1, 414 P.2d 335
(1966) (applied to requirement that those holding themselves out as
specialists have approved training in their specialty).
67 State v. Willburn, 49 Hawaii 651, 426 P.2d 626 (1967).
68 Zito v. Kingsley, 92 N.J. Super. 37, 42, 222 A.2d 130, 133 (Super. Ct.
1966) ("The problem which plaintiffs pose is one that may be found in
any classification of objects which must be described in the language
available to drafters of legislation."); cf. Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co.
v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 399 (1940).
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to be considered administratively in order to arrive at compliance
with the standard.6 9 These decisions properly seem to fall within
the category here treated.
(3) Imprecise Standard Applied to Limited Subject Matter.
In these cases, while the words used are of a more imprecise
type than those used in standards coming within the first two cate-
gories, the legislation relates to a narrow subject matter. This lim-
itation makes it possible for agencies and courts to discern the
objectives which the legislature desires to reach.
Examples of a standard of this sort include an authority to pre-
scribe the books and records to be kept by a taxpayer, obviously
intended to be limited to such as will facilitate the determination
of liability and the collection of the revenue; 70 regulations concern-
ing the use of federal forest reserves such as will insure their
objects;71 rules for the disposition of enemy owned property, seized
during war, the court implying that these must be such as would
promote the successful prosecution of the conflict;72 authority to
prescribe reasonable variations, tolerances, exemptions as to small
packages, in connection with a statutory requirement that pack-
ages shipped in interstate commerce be plainly marked to show
contents in terms of weight, measure or numerical amount;
73
authority to regulate the alcoholic liquor traffic; 74 determination of
professional experience as the basis for issuance of an occupational
license.75
One of the most interesting applications of this classification
relates to acts which, while they wholly omit verbally to state any
sort of standard, nevertheless deal with a subject so narrowly lim-
ited that the public interest which the legislature desires served,
and the manner of furtherance, are clearly apparent, at least upon
69 N.B.C. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943), affords a typical example.
The court relied upon New York Central Securities Corp. v. United
States, 287 U.S. 12 (1932), wherein the objectifying factors were found
in various other provisions of the Transportation Act of 1920 which
added up to concern with adequate, efficient, economic, appropriately
provided and adjusted national transportation service. Cf. Opp Cotton
Mills, Inc. v. Adm'r of Wage and Hour Div., 312 U.S. 126 (1941).
70 United States v. Eaton, 144 U.S. 677 (1892).
71 United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911).
72 United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 272 U.S. 1, (1926). Note
that this case also might be classified under the last category, discussed
hereafter.
73 United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77 (1932).
74 Boehl v. Sabre Jet Room, Inc., 349 P.2d 585 (Alas. 1960).
75 Garman v. Myers, 183 Okla. 141, 80 P.2d 624 (1938).
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reasonable reflection. Most of the cases which appear at first blush
to authorize unguided delegation may be sustained upon this basis.
The point is best illustrated by consideration of two cases aris-
ing in New York. In the first,7 6 the relevant legislation forbade the
vending of milk without a written permit from the appropriate
board of health. Naught was said about the basis on which the
board should determine whether to grant or to refuse permission.
Nonetheless, the New York courts sustained the requirement against
objections brought on constitutional grounds. The Appellate Divi-
sion perhaps most clearly expressed the basis by saying that;
It was clearly lawful ... to prohibit.., any person from dealing
in milk without first obtaining a license under reasonable conditions
and restrictions with reference to the source of supply, the manner
of transporting and keeping the milk, and such supervision of the
same as may tend to insure the delivery of wholesome milk to con-
sumers ....
The section, properly construed, does not permit unjust dis-
crimination .... 77
This is all very well, but the legislation does not speak at all about
"the delivery of wholesome milk to consumers" or the ways in which
this is to be accomplished. What the court really is saying is that
the only reasonable objective that the legislature could have had
in mind in authorizing regulation of the sale of milk by the require-
ment of a license therefor was the protection of consumers against
the perils of unwholesome, adulterated or watered milk. In the
classic words of Li'l Abner, "Any fool can plainly see!" The court of
appeals was less detailed in its repulsion of the constitutional objec-
tion: "It is presumed that public officials will discharge their duties
honestly and in accordance with the rules of law. 78 However, it
is clear that the foundation for its judgment matched that of the
appellate division.
The second New York decision" denied validity to a statute
requiring private schools, as a prerequisite to operation, to be
"registered under regulations of the commissioner."8° There was
76 People ex rel. Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 175 N.Y. 440, 67 N.E. 913
(1903), aff'd 199 U.S. 552 (1905).
77 People ex rel. Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 81 App. Div. 128, 131-32, 80
N.Y.S. 1108, 1111 (1903).
78 People ex rel. Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 175 N.Y. 440, 446, 67 N.E.913,
914 (1903), aff"d 199 U.S. 552 (1905).
79 Packer Collegiate Institute v. Bd. of Regents, 298 N.Y. 184, 81 N.E.2d
80 (1948).
80 N.Y. Educ. Law § 3210 (2) (e) (McKinney 1953).
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dissent, but the majority of the court seem clearly right in this
determination.8 ' Quotation appears the most appropriate way of
illustrating the grounds for decision.
Try as we will. ., we cannot find in it, or around it, express or
implied, any standards at all. To be frank, we cannot understand
what it means or what it was intended to accomplish.82
The opinion then went on to summarize the broad, widely-ranging,
unconsolidated mass of regulations for the registration of schools
which the commissioner of education, acting with the authority of
the regents, had promulgated. The majority then concluded:
A comparison of those regulations with the bare and meager lan-
guage of the statute forces the conclusion that, however good or
bad the commissioner's rules may be, they were not controlled,
suggested or guided by anything in the statute. It is to be doubted
that the Legislature had in mind the requiring of financial state-
ments from nursery schools, or that it expected that the rules would
mandate 'parent education' in kindergartens. At any rate, the sta-
tute contains no declaration of purpose or policy, general or particu-
lar, and the commissoner was left to make such laws as he thought
wise-which he proceeded to do.83
The minority thought that a standard could be implied because "the
regulations to be promulgated.., by necessary inference, [must]
bear some reasonable relation to education."8  However, I think we
must agree that the field of "education" is so broad, and the theories
of what is proper, ranging from the disciples of John Dewey to those
of Max Rafferty, are so diverse that neither judges nor legal writers
may affirm, with any degree of confidence, that a particular regula-
tion conforms to or departs from a legislative policy no more speci-
fically enunciated than "relating to education." These two cases,
and the statutes upon which they are based, well illustrate the prin-
ciple of the unstated but clearly apparent standard.
The cases vary greatly in result. The Supreme Court of the
United States has tended to support delegations without expressly
spelled out standards wherever the subject is sufficiently narrow
and the consensus as to basic social needs is sufficiently developed
to allow adequate judicial policing of discretion. 3 It has seemed
s1 See discussion in 49 CoLtm. L. REv. 573 (1949).
82 Packer Collegiate Institute v. Bd. of Regents, 298 N.Y. 184, 191, 81
N.E.2d 80, 83 (1948).
83 Id.
84 Id. at 195, 81 N.E.2d at 85.
85 Douglas v. Noble, 261 U.S. 165 (1923); New York ex rel. Lieberman v.
Van De Carr, 199 U.S. 552 (1905), affirming the New York Lieberman
decision, see note 76 supra, Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86 (1890).
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more hesitant when freedom of speech might be affected. 8 Many
state decisions also uphold delegations without express standards
where the intended objectives can be spelled out from the narrow
subject matter of the enactment. 87 But there are decisions to the
contrary where the subject and the surrounding conditions seem
equally adapted to the discovery of legislative purpose.11 At least
in some of these cases, the results may have been influenced by the
common failure of courts and of counsel to analyze the problems
involved in the pursuit, capture and domestication of standards.
(4) Imprecise Words Acquiring Legal Significance.
Instances of this sort of terminology include that old term, fam-
iliar to all judges and lawyers from the early beginnings of our law:
reasonable. Attach that to your standard, and you are almost sure
of a sympathetic hearing, because every judge of any experience
at all is perfectly at home with the rule of reason and its application.
86 Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951), declining to support New York
courts in reading into an ordinance which, without a formal standard,
required a license for street preaching, the implication that the right
should be denied only for proper cause such as public ridicule and de-
nunciation of other beliefs.
87 In re Petersen, 51 Cal. 2d 177, 331 P.2d 24 (1958) (designation of taxi-
cab stands); State v. Gray, 61 Conn. 39, 22 A. 675 (1891) (liquor li-
cense); Cutsinger v. City of Atlanta, 142 Ga. 555, 83 S.E. 263 (1914)(rooming house license; Marchesi v. Selectmen of Winchester, 312
Mass. 28, 42 N.E. 2d 817 (1942) (bowling alley license); State ex rel.
Minces v. Schoenig, 72 Minn. 528, 75 N.W. 711 (1898) (gift, fire and
bankrupt sales); Shelton College v. State Bd. of Education, 48 N.J.
501, 226 A.2d 612 (1967) (whether college should be licensed to grant
degrees); Belmont v. Parent, 90 N.H. 249, 7 A.2d 255 (1939) (site forjunkyard); State v. Van hook, 182 N.C. 831, 109 S.E. 65 (1921) (dance
hall license); Rowland v. State, 104 Ohio St., 366, 135 N.E. 622 (1922)(same); Adams v. New Kensington, 357 Pa. 557, 55 A.2d 392 (1947)(mechanical music); McMillan v. Sims, 132 Wash. 265, 231 P. 943
(1925) (designation of fish reserves); State ex rel. Hardman v. City of
Glenville, 102 W. Va. 94, 134 S.E. 467 (1926) (pool hall license);
State ex rel. Bluemound Amusement Park v. Mayor of Milwaukee,
207 Wis. 199, 240 N.W. 847 (1932) (revocation of amusement license).
88 Ellis v. Thiesen, 78 Fla. 47, 82 So. 607 (1919) (extension of time for
required action); Territory v. Ontai, 28 Hawaii 534 (1925) (location for
dance hall); People v. Brown, 407 11. 565, 95 N.E.2d 888 (1950) (con-
duct of licensure examination); Schireson v. Walsh, 354 IL 40, 187
N.E. 921 (1933) (revocation of physician's licenses); Noel v. People,
187 Ili. 587, 58 N.E. 616 (1900) (permits to sell proprietary and do-
mestic remedies); Bear v. City of Cedar Rapids, 147 Iowa 341, 126
N.W. 324 (1910) (milk dealer's license); City of Shreveport v. Hem-
don, 159 La. 113, 105 So. 244 (1925) (prohibition or limitation of park-
ing on streets); Jones v. Logan City Corp., 19 Utah 2d 169, 428 P.2d
160 (1967) (condemnation of dangerous building); Thompson v. Smith,
155 Va. 367, 154 S.E. 579 (1930) (revocation of driver's license).
486 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 47, NO. 3 (1968)
Specification of reasonable rates, whether for public utilitiess 9 or for
insurers,90 or for coal mines9 or for vendors of commodities, 92 rea-
sonable profits,98 reasonable fees,94 or provision for reasonable hos-
pital costs,95 or for reasonable rules as to service, 6 all find judi-
cial approval as workable standards.97 The term "discriminatory,"
with a like background in public utility law, finds acceptance. 98
Cause or good cause, in connection with the discipline of licensed
occupations or of public employees, also has a sufficiently familiar
ring to judges experienced in the common law,9 9 not possessed by
less "artificial" words. °00 Such long standing concepts as the public
health,'10 the public safety,10 2 the public order,10 3 and the public
peace,104 the public morals,10 generally have been deemed to pos-
sess enough background of judicial administration to permit em-
ployment as guides to administrative conduct. How long the com-
mon law terms will be permitted to survive the growing dislike of
the Supreme Court of the United States for like terms in the crim-
Inal law that, through their vagueness, may lead to abridgment of
89 United States v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 291 U.S. 457 (1934); Village of
Saratoga Springs v. Saratoga Gas, Elec. Lt. & Pow. Co., 191 N.Y. 123,
83 N.E. 693 (1908).
90 State ex rel. Wisconsin Inspection Bureau v. Whitman, 196 Wis. 472,
220 N.W. 929 (1928).
91 Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940).
92 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) ("reasonable return"). "Fair
and equitable" has a sound similarly comforting to judicial ears. Yakus
v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
'93 Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hyde, 34 F.2d 185 (W. D. Mo. 1929).
94 Kesselring v. Wakefield Realty Co., 312 Ky. 334, 227 S.W.2d 416 (1950).
95 Masachusetts Hosp. Serv., Inc. v. Conm'r of Administration, 351 Mass.
248, 218 N.E.2d 383 (1966).
96 Avent v. United States, 266 U.S. 127 (1924).
97 The reverse concept of unreasonability found acceptance as long ago
as the decision in Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
99 See note 90 supra.
99 Farish v. Young, 18 Ariz. 298, 158 P. 845 (1916); G. F. Redmond & Co.
v. Michigan Securities Comm'n, 222 Mich. 1, 192 N.W. 688 (1923).
100 Cf. Fisher v. State Ins. Bd., 139 Okla. 92, 281 P. 300 (1929) ("other
bad practices").
101 Moy v. City of Chicago, 309 fI1. 242, 140 N.E. 845 (1923); Weber v. Bd.
of Health, 148 Ohio St. 389, 74 N.E.2d 331 (1947).
102 Commonwealth v. Slocum, 230 Mass., 180, 119 N.E. 687 (1918); Am.
Baseball Club of Philadelphia v. City of Philadelphia, 312 Pa. 311, 167
A. 891 (1933).
103 City of Milwaukee v. Ruplinger, 155 Wis. 391, 145 N.W. 42 (1914).
104 Talarico v. City of Davenport, 215 Iowa 186, 244 N.W. 750 (1932).
105 Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Board of Regents, 305 N.Y. 36, 113 N.Y.2d
502 (1953).
108 Kingsley int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of New York Univ., 360 U.S.
684 (1959).
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liberty of expression 0 or of demonstration'0 7 or to oppression of
the disadvantaged 0 8 is worthy of consideration. Perhaps, at least
to the extent that substantive consitutional objections are cleared,
a resolution may be found in combining these terms with provisions
for procedural safeguards, discussed in the next classification.
The common law is not the sole source of clarifying specificity.
This may derive from experience with the administration of other
statutes,10 9 even from other jurisdictions, 10 or from prior adminis-
trative experience under like language."' This raises the possibility
that what once may have been unconstitutionally vague now is
valid, simply because failure to challenge gave it a chance to prove
its utility. I doubt that we need be greatly disturbed by this inter-
esting demonstration of the Holmesian aphorism that the life of the
law consists in experience.
(5) Imprecise Words Aided by Analogous Statutes.
In a sense, this is only a specific application of the familiar rule
of construction by which statutes in pari materia. are construed
together, "read together," as the phrase goes. Certainly, there need
be no great surprise that independent, but related, enactment may
be resorted to for the purpose of discovering the object which the
lawmakers wish administrators to accomplish. 2
(6) Imprecise Words Made Specific by Administrative Action.
In many, many instances, the needed specificity is provided
through application of the standards by the administrators, subject
to procedural safeguards, usually involving notice to parties in
interest, with full opportunity to be heard, supplemented by resort
to judicial review if there is challenge to the application made of
the statutory language. Of course, this is a sort of bootstrap opera-
tion but it does give opportunity for the broad statutory language
107 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
108 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). Cf. Hicks v. District of Columbia, 383
U.S. 252 (1966) (dissenting opinion). The outrageous extension of the
concept of immorality to include political activity of teachers against
the superintendent and the school board, Watts v. Seward School
Board, 395 P.2d 372 (Alas. 1964), may add to the argument against
the adequacy of such a standard. I would prefer to regard it as an in-
supportable aberration, however, rather than as a demonstration of
inadequacy..
109 Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947).
110 Id.
111 Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965); Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S.
742 (1948); Wotton v. Bush, 41 Cal. 2d 460, 261 P.2d 256 (1953).
112 Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32 (1924); Blue v. Beach, 155 Ind. 121, 56
N.E. 89 (1900); Bankers Union Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 182 Okla. 103,
77 P.2d 26 (1938).
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to be sharpened through the adversary process and to give to the
parties ample opportunity to know what is being done to them,
upon what grounds, for what reasons. It also permits the full devel-
opment of the various factors of expedience and of public interest
that justify the very general policy expressed in the statute. It may
have been beyond the legislative competence to foresee all the
many situations to which the policy would apply, with sufficient
percipience to enable the lawmakers to lay down precise standards.
The provision of a means whereby specific application can be worked
out on the basis of data developed through the prescribed proce-
dures is calculated either to justify the administrative decision or
to render obvious its unwarranted character. As a result, despite
its bootstrap nature, in allowing the relationship between standard
and action to be demonstrated from the face of the record rather
than from the face of the statute, the category seems legitimate. As
a matter of fact, most, if not all, of the decisions in which judges
have said that the impossibility of writing precise standards justifies
omitting them prove, on examination, to have been rendered under
statutes which did provide for this sort of definatory procedure. 113
In many instances, the provision of procedural safeguards is
ancillary to standards that well might have been regarded as suffi-
ciently definite under other guarantees. Certainly this is so of the
federal Wage and Hour Administration's authority to fix wage rates
to reach a prescribed figure as rapidly as possible, with the negative
injunction not to curtail employment, and with a list of other factors
to be considered in setting the rate. This delegation seems justi-
fiable under either Category 2 or Category 3. However, in the sus-
taining opinion, weight was given to the provisions for hearing and
for judicial review.114
113 Typical cases include State Racing Comm'n v. Latonia Agricultural
Ass'n, 136 Ky. 173, 123 S.W. 681 (1909); Motors Acceptance Corp. v.
McLain, 154 Neb. 354, 47 N.W.2d 919 (1951); McCormick v. Bd. of
Education, 58 N.M. 648, 274 P.2d 299 (1954); City of Lakewood v.
Thormyer, 171 Ohio St. 135, 168 N.E.2d 289 (1960); Kelleher v. Min-
shull, 11 Wash. 2d 380, 119 P.2d 302 (1941); Morris v. West Virginia
Racing Comm'n, 133 W. Va. 179, 55 S.E.2d 263 (1949).
114 "True, the appraisal of facts in the light of the declared policy and in
conformity to prescribed legislative standards, and the inferences to
be drawn by the administrative agency from the facts, so appraised,
involve the exercise of judgment within the prescribed limits. But
where, as in the present case, the standards set up for the guidance
of the administrative agency, the procedure which it is directed to
follow and the record of its action which is required by the statute to
be kept or which is in fact preserved, are such that Congress, the
courts and the public can ascertain whether the agency has conformed
to the standards which Congress has prescribed, there is no failure
of performance of the legislative function." Opp Cotton Mills v. Adm'r
of Wage and Hour Div., 312 U.S. 126, 144 (1941).
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In other instances, the provision for administrative hearing
and determination seems decisive to the sustension of the test.
Examples are to be found in the determination of public conven-
ience and necessity as the foundation for granting or refusing per-
mission to furnish motor vehicle transportation service;' 15 in the
standards of undue or unnecessary complication of corporate secur-
ity structures and of unfair or inequitable distribution of voting
power as a basis for regulating public utility holding companies;" 6
in the protection of "correlative rights" and the prevention of
"waste" as a standard for the establishment of oil and gas well-
spacing requirements;117 in the prevention of the waste of gas as
a test for the validity of price-fixing orders;" 8 in the adoption of
official criteria for containers of horticultural products "in order to
promote, protect and further develop the horticultural interests of
the state."1 9 The significance of the relation between procedural
safeguards and the proper administration of standards has received
judicial recognition310 I suggest that recognition of its significance
will be of great advantage in clearing our approach to this matter.
(7) National Self-Preservation: War Power and Foreign Relations.
This category, obviously, has application to the national govern-
ment alone. In the leading case,' 2 ' it was asserted that less precision
in establishing a standard was required because
(1) the executive, under the Constitution, is for the sole organ of
the government in the field of international relations;
(2) the President, through his superior sources of confidential infor-
mation, is better informed than the Congress respecting the need
for action and the bases upon which it should be taken;
(3) the resultant need for preserving secrecy as to the information
which the President receives;
(4) the President's special responsibility to determine "the effect
which his action may have upon our foreign relations" [and]
(5) "the unwisdom of requiring Congress in this field of govern-
mental power to lay down narrowly definite standards by which
the President is to be governed."' 22
115 ICC v. Parker, 326 U.S. 60 (1945) (although Category 5 might also
apply).
3IEs American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90 (1946).
117 Patterson v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 182 Okla. 155, 77 P.2d 83 (1938).
118 Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 203 Okla. 35, 220
P.2d 279 (1950).
1219 See note 9 supra.
120 Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952); Boehl v. Sabre Jet Room, Inc.,
349 P.2d 585 (Alas. 1960); Warren v. Marion County, 222 Ore. 307, 353
P.2d 257 (1960).
121 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
122 Id. at 321-22.
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On cursory examination this seems to add up to the proposition
that Congress may just tell the President to go ahead and do what
he deems best for the country in the area of international affairs
or of the nation's defense. The practice, however, has been far
better than the preachment. The cases sustaining the foreign rela-
tions and defense power delegations, from the beginning, have
involved congressionally set standards that can be related reason-
ably to the categories governing more conventional delegations.' 1
The Brig Aurora v. United States,124 for instance, sustained condi-
tioning of the termination of the embargo upon foreign commerce
on the cessation of interference with our foreign trade by the prac-
tices of France and of Great Britain. Obviously, this falls under
Category 1. The Curtiss-Wright case12 5 itself, was determined on a
major directive, commanding contribution to "the reestablishment
of peace" between countries involved in a presently existing and
specifically designated war, which seems an adequate compliance
with Category 2, while the actual thing to be done, the prohibition
of arms sales to the combatants or those acting in their interest, fits
Category 1. The only wholly liberating provision is the authority
of the President to allow sales under "such limitations and excep-
tions" as he may prescribe. This dispensing power, however, was
not involved in the litigation. Hence we have no reason to read
the decision as sustaining it. However, there would be no difficulty
in a construction that the limitations and exceptions were to be
fashioned with a view to the basic standard, the reestablishment of
peace. The decisions in other war power and foreign relations cases
also seem capable of classification under one or the other of our
preceding categories. 12 6 The latest 127 definitely involves the dis-
12.3 See Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 422 (1935).
124 11 U.S. (7 CRANCH) 382 (1813).
125 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
126 Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 542 (1952), definitely refers to factors
related to Categories 4 and 5; Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742,
778-87 (1948), refers to considerations apt for Categories 4 and 5;
Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 512-16 (1944); and Yakus v.
United States, 321 U.S. 414, 420-27 (1944), involve considerations apt
to Categories 4 and 6; and United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc.,
272 U.S. 1 (1926), we have already placed in Category 3. In Northern
Pac. Ry. Co. v. North Dakota, 250 U.S. 135 (1919), the adequacy of
the standard of necessity for the national defense does not seem to
have been raised, perhaps because Congress by enactment, as shown
in the opinion, had approved the presidential seizure of transportation
and communication facilities. However, if we accept the successful
prosecution of war as an adequate standard for implication, United
States v. Chemical Foundation, supra, it surely must be adequate when
expresed.
127 See note 109, supra.
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covery and the application of a standard which the court finds
clearly apparent, though unexpressed, on the basis of past admin-
istrative practice under similar legislation, available to Congress
when it acted. This clearly falls under Category 4. The one aberra-
tion which may justify the separate category is the Knauff deci-
sion.1 28 In view of the strong dissents in that case, and the cur-
rent of judicial opinion apparent in the Kent and the Zemel
decisions, there may be doubt as to how much authority remains
in the sustension of the sufficiency of the standard "interests of the
United States," unsupplemented by any procedural safeguards, as
a base for executive interference with most important personal
rights.
In conclusion, may I suggest that the concept that American
constitutions, as customarily framed, require administrative powers
over persons and their interests, or, even over significant questions
of the conduct of public affairs, to be vested under reasonably
intelligible and administrable standards performs a valuable role
in the operation of a legal order devoted to liberty and also to
effective governance. Much of the doubt as to its effectiveness, and
therefore, as to its value, stems from our failure to systematize its
application. I hope that the discussion here may stimulate the con-
scious effort to achieve such a systemization.
128 United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
